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Proxy signatures allow a principal to delegate its right of signing messages to another 
principal. Traveling executives can delegate to their secretaries to sign certain documents during 
their absence. Managers can delegate to their subordinates to perform certain signatures. 
Delegating the power of digital signature on digital documents to a proxy creates many technical 
challenges. 
Mambo, et al. [MU096] gave a systematic discussion of proxy signatures. Lee, et al. 
[LKKOIA] constructed a strong non-designated proxy signature scheme in which the proxy 
signer had strong non-repudiation. Thus far, development of proxy signatures focused on 
protecting the original signer. The proxy signature schemes in [MU096, KIM97, LKKOIA, 
KBCOO] prevented proxy signers from signing messages unfavourable for the original signers. 
These schemes also prevented proxy signers to repudiate their signatures. 
Anonymity is a desirable property in electronic commerce applications. There may be 
situations that the proxy signer wishes to remain private. In this thesis, an enhancement to Lee, et 
al.'s scheme is suggested. We use the certified alias to extents their scheme. The resulting proxy 
signature scheme protects the privacy of the proxy signers. A detail mathematical description of 
the our scheme is presented. 
With proxy signer privacy protection, many functionalities can be achieved by proxy 
signatures. This thesis also discuss two potential applications of our proposed proxy signature 
scheme: mobile agent and group signature. 
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For thousands of years, kings, queens and generals relied on efficient communication to 
govern their countries. At the same time, they were all afraid of falling their messages into the 
wrong hands. Such incidents could reveal precious secrets to rival nations and betray vital 
information to opposing forces. The threat of enemy interception motivated the development of 
codes and ciphers: techniques for disguising a message so that only the intended recipient can 
read it. 
Cryptography has been used for military purposes in history. With the development of e-
commerce, cryptography is an enabling technology for protecting privacy and integrity of digital 
transactions in the cyber space. 
Some of the most fundamental cryptographic primitives are symmetric cipher, asymmetric 
cipher, digital signature, message digest, zero-knowledge proof, and digital certificates. These 
primitives have been used extensively in constructing security protocols for e-commerce 
applications. 
This thesis focuses on a special kind of digital signature scheme called the proxy signature. 
The purpose of using proxy signature is to allow a principal to delegate its right of signing 
messages to another principal. 
Thus far, development of proxy signatures focused on protecting the original signer. The 
protocols of proxy signature schemes in [MU096, KIM97, LKKOIA, KBCOO] prevented proxy 
signer from signing messages unfavourable for the original signer. These schemes also prevented 
proxy signer to repudiate his signature. 
Anonymity is a desirable property in electronic commerce applications. There may be 
situations that the proxy signer wishes to remain private. However, the proxy signature schemes 
in [MU096, KIM97, LKKOIA, KBCOO] failed to protect the privacy of the proxy signer. This 
thesis discusses a proxy signature scheme that achieves both anonymity and identifiability of 
proxy signer. 
1.1 Introduction to topic 
Proxy signatures allow a principal to delegate its right of signing messages to another 
principal. Mambo, et al. [MU096] motivated the need for delegating signature power by the 
following scenarios: 
Scenario 1 
Suppose an employee needs to leave his company for a business trip. During his absence, his 
secretary will take care of his emails. Since the employee's comment is influential in 
decision-making, some of the messages should be signed. The question is how can the 
secretary digitally sign the message under the employee ’s name? 
Scenario 2 
Suppose the president of a software company digitally signs all its programs under his secret 
s so as to certify the correctness of the content. The attached digital signature offers a 
functionality of detecting alterations done to the programs. Because of security concerns, the 
president does not want to give s to his programmers. Nevertheless, he does not have enough 
time to sign all the programs his company produces. The questions is how the programmers 
can sign their programs with the name of the president, without obtaining the president's 
secret s ？ 
Proxy signatures are signature schemes that capable of solving the problems in scenario 1 and 
2. With proxy signature, an original signer can produce multiple signatures in an efficient and 
parallel fashion, with the help of his proxies. 
1.2 What is proxy signature? 
Formally, the proxy signature is a signature scheme that allows an original signer to delegate 
its signing capability to a proxy signer. With the delegation, the proxy signer creates signatures 
on behalf of the original signer. To verify the proxy signatures, the verifier checks both the proxy-
created signatures and the original signer's delegation. 
The following example explains how Alice can delegate Bob the right of signing messages. 
1. Delegate: Alice certifies Bob's public key and warrant. The warrant describes the 
relation between Alice and Bob, the messages which Bob is allowed to sign, the 
period of delegation, ... , etc. 
2. Proxy-Sign: Bob uses the certified key to proxy-sign. The signature is supplemented 
by Alice's certified warrant to authenticate the delegation relation between Alice and 
Bob. 
3. Verify: Victor, the verifier, uses the ordinary digital signature verification algorithm 
to check the signature created by Bob. Victor also checks the warrant to confirm 
Alice's agreement on the signed message. 
1.3 Terminologies in proxy signature 
This section introduces some terminologies which are used extensively in literatures of proxy 
signature: 
• Proxy Problem - They are the problems arose by delegating rights. Proxy signature is 
a solution to a particular kind of proxy problem: delegating the signature rights 
• Original Signer — An original signer refers to the grantor who grants his power of 
signing messages to a proxy signer. 
• Proxy Signer - A proxy signer refers to the grantee who obtains the power of signing 
messages from an original signer. 
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• Delegation - It refers to the process of granting the power of signing message. At the 
end of the delegation process, the proxy signer is capable of signing messages on 
behalf of the original signer. 
• Warrant — Warrant is a specification issued by the original signer. It restricts the 
contents and the period of time for the proxy signer to sign. The identities of proxy 
signers can be listed in the warrant. 
• Consecutive Execution and Direct Form — They are two different approaches of 
constructing cryptographic protocols. Consecutive execution achieves its objective by 
combining cryptographic primitives in a modular fashion. Direct form achieves the 
same objective by modifying the equations of the cryptographic primitives. Such 
modifications establish additional functionalities. The approach of direct form 
usually has better performance than consecutive execution. However, readers would 
found that the resulting protocol of consecutive execution is easier to understand. 
1.4 Levels of delegation 
Mambo, et al. [MU096] gave a systematic discussion of proxy signature. They mentioned 
three levels of delegation: 
1. Full delegation: The original signer gives its private key to the proxy signer and the 
proxy signer uses the private key to sign messages on behalf of the original signer. 
Verifiers cannot tell whether the signature was created by the proxy signer or by the 
original signer. 
2. Partial delegation: The original signer generates a proxy signature key from its private 
key and gives the proxy signature key to the proxy signer through a secure channel. The 
proxy signer uses the proxy signature key to sign messages. The proxy signatures in 
partial delegation are distinguishable from the signatures created by the original signer. 
3. Delegation by warrant As described in the previous section, the original signer's warrant 
restricts the signing capability of the proxy signer. The warrant and the public signature 
key are certified by the original signer. The proxy signer obtains the warrant form the 
original signer and uses the corresponding private key to sign. The resulting signature 
consists of the proxy-signed signature and the certified warrant. 
Different levels of delegation serve different security requirements of proxy signatures. The 
following points should be considered when deciding the level of delegation: 
1. Partial delegation and delegation by warrant are more secure than full delegation. This is 
because their resulting proxy signatures are distinguishable from ordinary signatures. 
2. Delegation by warrant can be implemented by consecutive executing ordinary signature 
schemes. 
3. The faster processing speed of partial delegation has an advantage over delegation by 
warrant. 4. The delegation by warrant is capable of restricting documents to be proxy-signed. 
5. Partial delegation does not specify its valid period. As a result, a proxy revocation 
protocol is needed, 
A proxy signature scheme can be constructed by any of these levels. The most appropriate 
level of delegation should be selected according to the security requirement, message length, and 
the computation power of both signer and verifier. 
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1.5 Previous work on Proxy Signature 
The idea of proxy signature was discussed in [VAB91, MU096]. As a sub problem of the 
‘‘proxy problem", Neuman [BC93] proposed two schemes for delegating signature right: "bearer 
proxy” and "delegated proxy". Both of them achieved their goals by consecutive execution. 
Mambo，et al. [MU096] suggested the term “proxy signature". They proposed 2 proxy 
signature schemes: Basic Protocol and Proxy Protected Protocol. Mambo, et al. constructed their 
schemes using partial delegation and implemented them by direct form equations. They achieved 
better performance than the schemes proposed in [BC93]. 
Kim, et al. [KPW97] further modified the schemes in [MU096]. Their scheme was called 
partial delegation by warrant. It inherited the efficiency merit of partial delegation and the 
functional merit of delegation by warrant. With such modification, the original signer gains the 
power of restricting the signing capability of the proxy signer. As the warrant included the 
proxy's identity, this can prevent the transfer of proxy power to another party. 
The proxy signature scheme of Lee, et al. [LKKOIA] did not explicitly include the 
identity of the proxy signer in the warrant. In particular, the proxy signer could independently 
generate a proxy signature key from the warrant. Since the identity of proxy signer is not 
explicitly listed, the warrant of delegation can be transferred to another party. Scheme in both 
[KIM97] and [LKKOIA] exposed the identity of the proxy signer in the signature. This feature 
ensures the proxy signer cannot repudiate its signature. 
The above schemes [MUO96,KPW97,LKK01 A] were discrete-log based. There were 
also proxy signature schemes based on RSA equations [ST97, KBCOO, LKKOIB]. Sander, et al. 
[ST97] suggested the use of CEF (Computing with Encrypted Function) to achieve undetachable 
signature. Kotzanikolaous, et al. [KBCOO] realized that suggestion. Lee, et al. [LKKOIB] further 
extended Kotzanikolaous, et al.'s result to support strong non-repudiation by including the proxy 
signer's public key in the verification equations. 
1.6 Our Contributions 
This thesis has two contributions. First, it suggested an enhancement to the existing strong non-
designated proxy signature scheme, which was proposed by Lee, et al. [LKKOIA]. Instead of 
exposing the identity of proxy signer explicitly, our scheme adds pseudonymity to delegation. 
The identity of proxy signer is hidden behind an alias. If needed, the alias issuing authority can 
identify the proxy by the alias. 
The second contribution of this thesis is to demonstrate how to apply proxy signature 
with proxy signer privacy protection to different applications. Examples on mobile agent and 
group signature are given in the following chapters. 
1.7 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is organized as follows: 
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Chapter 1 is an introduction to the thesis. Chapter 2 introduces some useful cryptographic 
concepts which are used extensively throughout this thesis. An overview of the features that can 
be achieved by our scheme is presented in Chapter 3. A detail mathematical explanation of our 
proposed scheme is given in Chapter 4. Practical applications on our proposed scheme is explored 




This chapter introduces some important cryptographic tools and concepts. They are used 
extensively in the following chapters. 
2.1 Digital Signature 
Digital signature of a message is actually a number that depends on the private key of the 
signer and the content of the message being signed. A signature must be verifiable. In a dispute, 
an unbiased third party should be able to resolve the matter equitably without accessing to the 
signer's private key. 
The following are some basic definitions related to digital signature: 
1. A digital signature is a data string which associates with a message and with the 
originating entity. 
2. A digital signature generating algorithm is a method for producing a digital signature. 
3. A digital signature verification algorithm is a method for verifying the authenticity of a 
digital signature. 
4. A digital signature scheme consists of a signature generation algorithm and an associated 
verification algorithm. 
There are two general classes of digital signature schemes, which can be briefly summarized 
as the following: 
1 • Digital signature schemes with appendix require the original message as input to the 
verification algorithm. 
2. Digital signature schemes with message recovery do not require the original message as 
input to the verification algorithm. In this case, the original message can be recovered 
from the signature itself. 
2.2 Digital Certificate and CA. 
The application of digital signature includes authentication, data integrity, and non-
repudiation. One of the most significant applications of digital signatures is the certification of 
public keys in large networks. Certification is a mean for a certificate authority (CA)-which is a 
trusted third party-to bind the identity of a user to his public key. Using the digital certificate, 
other parties can authenticate the public key of a user without the help from the CA. 
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2.3 Hash Functions 
Cryptographic hash functions play a fundamental role in modem cryptography. A hash 
function takes a message as an input and produces an output. The output is referred to as a hash-
value, or simply hash. More precisely, a hash function h maps strings of arbitrary finite length to 
strings of fixed length. Hash functions are used for data integrity in conjunction with digital 
signature schemes. A message is typically hashed first, and then the hash-value is digitally 
signed. 
The following are the basic properties of hash function: 
• Compression: h maps an input jc of arbitrary finite bit length to an output h(x) of 
fixed bit length n. 
• Ease of computation: given h and an input x, h(x) is easy to compute. 
There are also some additional properties of hash function: 
• Collision resistance: It is computationally infeasible to find two distinct inputs which 
hash to the same output. 
• One-way: It is computationally infeasible to find an input that hashes to a pre-
specified output. 
2.4 Bit commitment 
Bit commitment protocols are a basic components of many cryptographic protocols. One 
party, Alice, commits to the other party, Bob, to a bit b, in such a way that Bob has no idea what 
b is. At the latter stage, Alice can reveal the bit b and Bob can verify that this is indeed the value 
to which Alice committed. A good way to think about bit commitment is as if Alice writes the bit 
and puts it in a locked box. Only Alice has the key of the box. She gives the box to Bob. When 
the time is ripe, she opens the box. Bob knows that the contents were not tampered with since the 
box was in his possession. Bit commitment protocols have been used for zero knowledge 
protocols identification schemes, and multi-party protocols. They can also implement Blum's 
coin flipping over the phone. 
By definition, a bit commitment protocol consists of two stages: 
1. The commit stage: Alice has a bit b to which she wishes to commit to Bob. She and Bob 
exchange messages. At the end of this stage Bob has some information that represents b. 
2. The reveal stage: At the end of which Bob knows b. 
For all probabilistic polynomial time, all polynomials p, and a large enough security 
parameter n, the protocol must obey the following: 
1. After the commit stage, Bob cannot guess b with probability greater than Yi+l/pfn). 
2. Alice can reveal only one possible value. If she tries to reveal a different value, she is 
caught with probability at least \-\/p(n). 
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Chapter 3 
Brief introduction to Our Result 
3.1 A Proxy Signature Scheme with Proxy Signer Privacy Protection 
We propose a strong proxy signature scheme which provides proxy signer privacy 
protection. Our scheme is an extension to the "Strong Proxy Signature Scheme" suggested by 
Lee, et al. [LKKOIA]. The "Strong Proxy Signature Scheme" achieved the following properties: 
1. Strong unforgeability - Only the designated proxy signer can create a valid proxy 
signature. The original signer and unauthorized third parties cannot create a valid 
proxy signature under the name of a particular proxy signer. 
2. Strong non-repudiation - Once a proxy signer creates a valid proxy signature, it 
cannot repudiate its signature against anyone. This property prevents proxy 
signer from taking back its claim. 
3. Verifiability - The original signer's agreement on the proxy-signed message can 
be verified from the signature. The signature can be verified by unbiased verifiers 
using publicly available parameters. 
4. Non-designated — The warrant of delegation issued by the original signer is 
transferable among the proxy signers. 
5. Strong identifiability 一 Anyone can determine the identity of the proxy signer 
from a proxy signature. 
In property 5: Strong Identifiability, the identity of proxy signer can be identify from its 
proxy signature. This property has consequences. There may be situations that the proxy signer 
wishes to remain private. The original signer may also wishes to keep the trust relation between it 
and its proxy signer private. 
We propose a proxy signature scheme that achieves the first 4 properties of Lee, et al's 
scheme. In addition to that, our scheme achieves the following properties: 
6. Proxy privacy — the identity of the proxy signer cannot be revealed from the 
proxy signature and the signed document alone. 
7. Privacy revocation - If needed, a proper authority can determine the identity of 
the proxy signer from its signature. 
There are certain utilities in property 6 and property 7. Property 6 provides anonymity for 
proxy signers who wish to remain private. However, property 7 ensures that the proxy's identity 
can by traced if the need of investigation arises. 
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In the next chapter, we will give a detail explanation on how to achieve the above 6 
properties. 
3.2 Applications of Proxy Signature 
In this thesis, the following potential applications of our proposed proxy signature 
scheme are discussed. 
1. Group signature: The group signature scheme was introduced by David Chaum in 
[CH91]. The purpose of the group signature is to protect the anonymity of a group 
member. With group signature, a group member convince the verifier that he belongs 
to a group, without revealing his actual identity. In case of disputes, a group 
administrator can determine the identity of the group member from its signature. Our 
scheme can be considered as a general form of proxy signature. The group 
administrator plays the role of the alias issuing authority and the original signer, 
while the group members play the role of proxy signers. Since our proxy signature 
scheme provides anonymity and identifiability of proxy signer, it satisfies the 
requirement of group signature. In latter chapter, we will demonstrate how to apply 
our scheme to construct a group signature scheme with unlimited group size. 
2. Mobile Agent: Mobile agent signature problem is another potential application of 
proxy signature with proxy signer privacy protection. Mobile agents are software 
entities that are able to migrate across different execution environments. They usually 
carry out goal-oriented tasks automatically on behalf of their owners. Since mobile 
agents rely on the computation environment of the hosts to execute, malicious hosts 
can tamper their code and data. This threat raises the problem of revealing the private 
key of agent owner if the mobile agent has to create digital signatures. Proxy 
signature can be applied to solve this problem. According to Lee, et al. [LKKOIB], 
an agent owner can delegate his agent which may signs on its itinerary. In the 
framework of [LKKOIB], the proxy signer is referred to the remote host where the 
mobile agent signs. As mentioned above, the proxy signature scheme of [LKKOIB] 
reveals the proxy signer's identity; the itinerary of the mobile agent can be 
determined from the proxy signature. When our scheme is applied to mobile agent 
signature problem, it protects the itinerary privacy of mobile agents. 
Applications of proxy signature is not limited to these areas. With proxy signer privacy 
protection, even more functionalities can be achieved. 
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Chapter 4 
Detail Explanation of Certified Alias 
and its Application on Proxy Signature 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to discuss how to protect proxy signer's privacy. There were papers discussing 
the protection of signer privacy [CH91]. Their schemes successfully hide the identity of the signer. 
It is obvious that if the signer's own key pair is used in creating signatures, verifiers can 
identify the signer from the signature. Challenges aroused when the signer wishes to remain 
private, and, at the same time, want his signature to be authentic. In such a situation, an alias 
issuing authority, which is a trusted third party, is usually involved to generate alias for the 
signer. The signer uses the alias in place of its identity. 
In this chapter, we will give the definition of "Certified Alias", explain how it works with 
proxy signature. 
4.2 Protecting Signer Privacy Using Certified Alias 
Alias is an temporary identity replacing the actual identity of a principal. There is an 
unbiased alias issuing authority，or simply trustee, responsible for aliases management. With a 
certified alias, the signature created by a particular signer cannot directly linked to the identity of 
the signer. This is because the identity is difficult to compute from the alias alone. In case of 
disputes, the alias issuing authority can reveal the identity behind the alias. With such a 
revelation, third parties can verify the identity protected by the alias . To protect its integrity and 
authenticity, the alias should be certified by the alias issuing authority. The following are 
definitions of some important terms: 
Definition 4.2.1 
Identity. The identity of a principal P i s a unique number IDp representing him. 
Definition 4.2.2 
Identification token: Identification token of a principal P is a tuple generated by the alias 
issuing authority. It consists of a random number kp , which is only known to the 




Alias: Alias is a number generated by the trustee. It protects the identity of a principal P. 
It is generated by a cryptographically secure hash function h(.) . The alias of a principal P 
can be computed by hashing his identification token: 
hp = h(kpJDp) 
The random number is introduced to prevent brute force attack on the alias. 
Definition 4.2.4 
Certified Alias: A Certified Alias for a principal P is a certificate generated by the alias 
issuing authority. The certificate contains the alias of P and the public signature key Kp. It 
is donated by Certj{hp,Kp) 
To protect the privacy of the signers, we propose using the trustee (7) to generate 
Certified Alias for each signer (F). The signer use the private key corresponding to the public 
signature key in the certified alias to sign. Since the signature keys are generate by the trustee, the 
signature created by these keys will not reveal the identity of the signers. 
If disputes occur, the alias issuing authority can reveal the identification token (kp JDp) 
of the signer in question. Verifiers compares the hash value of the identification token with hp 
to confirm the signer's identity. 
4.3 Constructing Proxy signature Scheme by Consecutive Execution of 
Cryptographic Primitives (Scheme CE) 
This section describes a proxy signature scheme with proxy privacy protection: Scheme CE. The 
scheme is constructed by combining cryptographic primitives in a modular fashion. 
Assumptions 
To ensure the correctness of our scheme, we have to make the following assumptions: 
1. Let h(.) be a cryptographically secure hash function. 
2. Let 
<7 =sign(m, ) 
be a signature algorithm, and 
verify{m, a,K) = T / F 
be the corresponding verification algorithm, m is the signed message, a is the signature. 
K—�is the private key for signing. K is the public key for verifying the signature. 
3. The key pair (public key, private key) of the trustee(T) is 
[KT, K T � � 
the key pair of the original signer (M) is 
(Km，KjJ� 
The public key of the trustee and the original signer can be retrieved from public directories. 
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4. The secure channels between the trustee and the proxy signer，and between the origianl signer 
to the proxy signer are established by cryptographically secure methods, such as SSL, TLS. 
Step 1: Issuing alias 
In this step, the trustee generates key pairs and certified aliases for the proxies. We only present 
how the trustee interact with one of the proxies (P). In real cases, the trustee will repeat this 
procedure until all the proxies get their key pairs and certificates. 
1. The proxy signer sends its identity IDp to the trustee. 
2. Trustee generates a key pair 
{^Ktp , Kjp ) 
3. The trustee generates a random number 
k p G "Zi 
and a hash value 
hp =h{kpJDp) 4. The trustee creates a certificate 
Certj{Kjp,hp) 
5. The trustee sends the following tuple to proxy (P) 
through a secure channel. 
6. The trustee records 
ihp,kp,IDp) 
in case privacy revocation is needed. 
7. The proxy verifies the certificate by 
verify {Cert J- {Kjp, hp), Kj) 
8. At the end of this step, the proxy signer P obtains its certified alias. P is convinced that the 
alias is issued by the trustee. 
T P IDp 
< 
Gen 




verify{ Certj (Kjp ,hp�,KT� 
12 
Figure 4.1: Issuing Alias 
Step 2: Delegating 
In this step, the proxy obtains the delegation from the original signer. 
1. The original signer generates a signature on the warrant m^ by computing 
2. The original signer then sends the tuple 
(w冰•从,/D似) 
to proxy (P). 
3. The proxy (P) verifies the signature by 
4. At the end of this step, the proxy signer can sign on behalf of the original signer. 
M P 
Cal a ^ = sign(m^,Kl}) 
— • 
Figure 4.2: Delegating 
Step 3: Proxy-Signing and Verifying 
1. The proxy (P) signs the message m by 
(J 二 sign(jn,K;�� 
2. The proxy produces a proxy signature in the following format 
ID^, Certj {Kjp, hp)) 
3. The verifier checks the proxy signature by the follow equations 
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verify{m,G,Kjp) 
verify{Certj (Kj^p ,hp),Kj) 
verify Km) 
4. The verifier checks if the signed message is conform to the warrant m^. 
5. At the end of this step, the verifier accepts the signature. 
P V 
<j = sign(m, K~p) 
{ m , I D m ’Cert-p(K-pp’hp)) 
• 
verify{m,(j,Kjp) 
venfy{Certj {Kjp ,hp),Kj) 
ven办(�•从,Km) 
message conform to warrant ？ 
Figure 4.3: Signing and Verifying 
Step 4: Revoking Privacy 
If the verifier finds the signature is not conform to the warrant, it can ask the trustee to reveal the 
identity of the proxy signer. 1. The verifier sends the signature 
(m，o"，Ww,o•似，IDM，CertT(欠JP , ^P)) 
to the trustee. 
2. The trustee verifies that the signature is indeed not conform to the warrant. 
3. The trustee sends the identification token 
(kpJDp) to the verifier. 4. Verifier compares the hash value 
KkpJDp) 
with hp to confirm the proxy identity. 5. At the end of this step, the verifier can be convinced that the signature 
( m , a , I D ^ , Cert^{Kjp,hp)) 
is created by the proxy signer P. 14 
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Figure 4.4: Revoking Privacy 
Security analysis of scheme CE 
1. Strong unforgeability: Since the signature is created by the private proxy signature key 
K~p , and only P received them. Original signer and other third parties do not have proxy 
signature key, so they cannot create valid proxy signature with the name of P. 
2. strong non-repudiation: The signature contains the alias of P which is certified by the 
alias issuing authority. Once the trustee revokes P's privacy, P cannot repudiate his 
signature. 
3. Verifiability: Verifier has to check the authenticity of the warrant. If the message is 
conform to the signed warrant, M's agreement on the signed message is verified. 
4. Non-designated: In the step of delegation, the original signer only sends (m州，o•似，/ZV) 
to the proxy signer. This signed warrant does not specify the identity of the proxy signer. 
As a result, the delegated proxy signer can pass the warrant to another third party. 
5. Proxy privacy: Since the public proxy signature does not contain any information 
directly related to identity of the proxy signer, verifiers cannot determine the proxy 
signer's identity from the signature alone. 6. Privacy Revocation: The alias issuing authority keeps the record of {hp,kp,IDp) for 
every alias. If disputes arises on the alias hp, the trustee can reveal the identification 
token (kpJDp). After the identification token is revealed, anyone can verify the hash 
value of (kp,IDp) with hp. 
4.4 Constructing Proxy signature Scheme by Direct Form Equations 
(Scheme DF) 
In this section, we present a more efficient scheme constructed by direct form: Scheme DF. The 
main difference between Scheme DF and Scheme CE is that generation of proxy signature key. In 
Scheme DF, the proxy signer combines the private part of the certified alias and the private part 
of certified warrant to form the private signature key. This feature provides extra security merit 
over Scheme CE. 
Assumptions: 
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To ensure the correctness of our scheme, we have to make the following assumptions: 
1. Let;? be a prime number, g is an element in the multiplicative group Z； whose order, q, is a 
large prime dividing p-\. A discrete logarithm problem with inputs p, g and a^^ z ] consists 
of finding the h^Z] such that g"三 Z^ mod p • The discrete logarithm problem is hard to solve. 
2. Let h(.) be a cryptographically secure hash function. 
3. Let a =sign(m,s) be a DL-based signature algorithm where m is the message to sign and s is 
the private key of the signer, a is the created signature. 
4. Let verifyim,c7,v) be the DL-based signature verification algorithm, which return true or 
false, m is the signed message, a is the signature, and v is the public key of the signer. 
5. The key pair (private key, public key) of Trustee (T) is 
ixr^yr) 
such that Xt e = g""^ modp . 
The key pair of Original signer (M) is 
The public keys of the trustee and the original signer can be retrieved from public directories. 
6. The secure channels between the trustee and the proxy signer , and between the origianl 
signer to the proxy signer are established by cryptographically secure methods, such as SSL, 
TLS. 
Step 1: Issuing Alias 
In this step，the trustee sends certificates for each proxies. We only present how the trustee 
interact with one of the proxies (P). The trustee will repeat this procedure until all the proxies get 
their certificates. 1. The proxy signer sends its identity IDp to the trustee. 
2. The trustee generate a random number kp Ej^ Z 
3. The trustee generate an alias by 
hp = h{kpJDp) 
where IDp is the identity of the proxy signer, hp is the alias of the proxy signer. 
4. The trustee then signs hp by computing 
^T Er ^q 
Vj = gkT mod p • 
Sj = XTk(Jip，rjO + � r mod q 
5. The trustee sends the following triple to the proxy signer through a secure channel 
6. The trustee records 
{hp,kpJDp) 
in case of privacy revocation. 
7. The proxy signer checks the congruence to verify the signature: 
8. At the end of this step, the proxy signer obtains a certified alias 
’ , S t � 
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from the trustee. 
P T ^ • 
K 
hp = KK,iDp� 
Figure 4.5: Issuing Alias 
Step 2: Delegating 
When original signer is ready to delegate its signing capability, 
1. The original signer signs the warrant m^ by computing 
^M GR Iq 
Vm 二 gkM mod/7 
Sm =太m 々 (所 w，rA/) +众A/mod;? 
2. The original signer then sends the tuple 
to the proxy signer. 
3. The proxy signer verifies the signature by checking the congruence: 
g � “ a / ( � � m o d p 
4. At the end of this step, the proxy signer obtains a certified warrant 
M P 
modp, 
讲 H,，，"^A/ ^ 
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Figure 4.6: Delegating 
Step 3: Proxy-signing and Verifying 
1. The proxy signer generates a private proxy signature key by computing 
s = s M + s^ mod^ 
2. The proxy signs the message m by DL-based signature algorithm, using s as private key. G - sign{m,s) 
3. The proxy signer produces a signature 
4. The verifier computes the public proxy signature key by 
= -^M-yr T 
5. The verifier verifies the signature by 
verify{m,c7,y) 
7. The verifier check if the message is conform to the warrant. 
8. At the end of this step, the verifier accepts the proxy signature. 
P V 
(J = sign{m,s) 
verify {m,G,y) 
^ , _ " ^ . Figure 4.7: Signing and verifying Step 4: Revoking Privacy ^ ^ ^ 
If the verifier finds the proxy signature is not conform to the warrant, it can ask the trustee to reveal the 
identity of the proxy. 
1. The verifier send the proxy signature 
to the trustee 
2. The trustee verifies that the signature is indeed not conform to the warrant 
3. The trustee sends the identification token 
ikpJDp) 
to verifier. 4. Verifier compares the hashed value 
h(kpJDp) 
with the alias to confirm the proxy identity. 5. At the end of this step, the verifier can be convinced that the signature 
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is created by the proxy signer P. 




Figure 4.8: Revoking Privacy 
Security analysis of scheme DF 
1. Strong unforgeability: Since the proxy signature key is generated using 5似 ^and^^^, and 
only P receive them. Original signer and other third parties do not have proxy signature 
key, so they cannot create valid proxy signature with the name o fP . 
2. Strong non-repudiation: The signature contains the alias of P which is certified by the 
alias issuing authority. P cannot repudiate his signature once the trustee revokes P 's 
privacy. 
3. Verifiability: The public proxy signature key includes the term 少a/(�’'似）.厂似 which 
represents M's agreement on m^. If the message is conform to the signed warrant, M's 
agreement on the signed message is verified. 
4. Non-designated: In the step of delegation, the original signer only sends to 
the proxy signer. Since this signed warrant does not specify the identity of the proxy 
signer, the delegated proxy signer can pass the warrant to another third party. 
5. Proxy privacy: Since The public proxy signature does not contain any information 
directly related to identity of the proxy signer, the verifiers cannot determine the proxy 
signer's identity from the signature alone. 
6. Privacy Revocation: The alias issuing authority keeps the record of (hp,kp,IDp) for 
every alias. If disputes occur on the alias hp，the trustee can reveal the identification 
token (kpJDp). After the identification token is revealed, verifiers can compare the hash 
value of IDp) with hpto confirm the proxy singer's identity. 
4.5 Comparison between scheme CE and scheme DF 
Scheme DF is more efficient than Scheme CE because only one signature verification is 
needed . Scheme CE requires 3 signature verifications. In scheme DF, computing y involves 2 
exponential operations. Although more exponential operations are involved, [MU096] showed 
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that direct form equations have still performance advantages over consecutive execution. 
Simulation details and complexity analyses are contained in [MU096]. 
Scheme DF has another advantage over scheme CE. For the same proxy signer, different 
proxy signature keys are used for different original signers. Scheme CE use the same proxy 
signature key for all original signers. The problem of using one proxy signature key for all 
delegation is that a third party C may manipulate the signatures. Lets consider the following 
example: 
Al and A2 delegates P to sign messages for them. P signs a message ml for Al, 
ml for A2, producing the following signatures 
, cTp m^i，o•⑷，ZD �，Certj{K^p，hp)) 
(>2, 0*2，肌冰2, ，ID 42, CcHt {Kjp , hp)) 
Both of the signature are valid signature. Yet if malicious third party C can 
manipulate the signatures by producing a new signature 
(m^, 0-2, m^i , o-^i, ID^,, Cert^ {K^p ,hp)). As long as the message m^ conform to 
warrant of , verifiers will think P has sign m^ on behalf of AL P cannot convince 
verifiers he has not created such a signature. 
Scheme DF will not suffer from this problem, because the proxy signature key is 
generated on each delegation. 
Scheme CE has an advantage over scheme DF. It does not limit the signature and verification 
algorithm to be DL-based. Both RSA-based and DL-based public key cryptosystem can be applied in 
Scheme CE. 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we have described the concept of certified alias. We have presented how to apply 
certified alias to construct a proxy signature scheme that protects proxy signer privacy. We have also 
suggested two practical implementation of our proxy signature scheme: Scheme CE and Scheme DF. 
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Chapter 5 
Applications of Proxy Signature with 
Proxy Signer Privacy Protection 
In previous chapter, we have suggested 2 proxy signature schemes with proxy signer 
privacy protection. In this chapter, we demonstrate some applications of our proxy signature 
scheme. 
5.1 Secure Mobile agent Signature with Itinerary Privacy 
5.1.1 Introduction to Mobile Agent 
Mobile agents are goal-directed programs. They are capable of suspending themselves on 
one platform and moving to another platform during execution. 
There has been a number of models describing mobile agent systems. For discussing 
security issues, it is sufficient to use a simple model which contains only two components: the 
agent and the host. The agent comprises the code and state information for computation. The 
computation is goal-directed, and is performed automously by the agent on behalf of the agent 
owner with the cooperation of other agents. Mobility allows an agent to move among hosts. The 
hosts provides the computational environment in which the agent operates. For simplicity, the 
host itself can be thought of as a collection of special purpose agents. These agents work together 
to provide the services and computational environment for mobile agents. 
5.1.2 Review on Lee, et al. strong non-designated proxy signature scheme for mobile agents 
Since mobile agents rely on the resources of hosts to execute, all code and data are 
exposed to the hosts. Malicious hosts can spy on the data and state information of the mobile 
agents. If traditional digital signature schemes were used, the mobile agents must carry their 
owner's private keys. As a result, the private keys are subjected to read attack by malicious hosts. 
Lee, et al. [LKKOIB] discussed how to applied proxy signature to a mobile agent. This section 
reviews the scheme of Lee, et al. [LKKOIB]. 
In the framework of mobile agent suggested by Lee, et al., there are 4 entities: 
Agent owner (A) : performs the role of original signer in proxy signature. It delegates the signing 
capability to the mobile agent. 
Host (B) : carries out proxy signature on behalf of the agent owner, and thus performs the role of 
proxy signer. 
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Agent ： acts as a message carrying vehicle. It carries the proxy signature keys, warrant of agent 
owner and created signatures on its itinerary. 
Verifier (V)： verifies the proxy signature created by the host. 
The scheme of Lee, et al. contains 3 steps 
Step 1: Preparing the agent (by agent owner) 
The agent owner generates a signature on the warrant m^ by computing 
r^ = gk'i mod p 
and load the tuple to the mobile agent. 
Step 2: Executing the agent (by host) 
When the agent arrived at the host, and ready to create proxy signature, it generates a proxy 
signature key {xp,yp) by computing 
Xp = s^ +Xgmodg， 
yp = gXp mod p 
where (;cs’_ys)is the static key pair of the host. And the host is strongly motivated to keep the 
static private key secret. 
The host uses the generated proxy signature key to sign message : 
dp = sign{m,Xp) 
and producing the signature as 
Step 3: Verifying the signature (by verifier) 
The verifier check the signature by 
verify{m,Gp,yp\ 
where y'p = 少 m o d 尸 
It also check if the signed message is conform to the warrant of the agent owner. 
Remarks on Lee, et al. scheme 
Since the resulting signature contains the identity of proxy signer. The 
verifiers can determine where the agent created the signature since the proxy signer is the host 
generated the signature. In the next section , we try to solve this problem by using proxy signature 
with proxy signer privacy protection. 
5.1.3 Constructing Signature scheme for Mobile Agent using Proxy signature with Proxy 
Signer Privacy Protection 
The scheme of Lee, et al. [LKKOIB] successfully prevents malicious host from reading 
the agent owner's private key. However, the resulting signature reveals the identity of the proxy 
signer. Verifiers can determine the host on which the mobile agent created the signature. This 
property offences itinerary privacy of a mobile agent. In this section, we give a construction of 
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signature scheme for mobile agent based on proxy signature with proxy signer privacy protection. 
The resulting scheme has all the properties of the scheme of Lee, et al. . Our scheme also achieve 
itinerary privacy protection for mobile agent. 
Scheme DF in chapter 4 is applied directly. We follow the framework defined by Lee, et 
al. [LKKOIB]. In addition to that, we add an entity trustee to the framework. 
The resulting scheme consists of 4 steps: 
Step 0: Setup 
In this component, the trustee generates certificate for each of the hosts. Here we only show the 
interaction between the trustee and one of the hosts (B). The trustee repeats this step until all the 
hosts get their certificates. 
The trustee generates an alias for host B by computing 
^B GR Z， 
hs=KksJDs) 
The trustee the signs the alias by its key pair 少7O 
Vj = gkT mod p, 
Sj = Xj •h{hg,rj') + kjmodq 
The trustee then sends the following tuple to the securely 
{hs^rj^Sj) 
Step 1: preparing the agent (by the agent owner) 
This component remains unchanged from the scheme of Lee, et al. 
Step 2: executing the agent (by the host) 
When the agent arrived at the host, and ready to create proxy signature, it generates a proxy 
signature key (xp,>^p)by computing 
Xp = s^ +Sfmodq, 
yp = g^'' mod p 
The host uses the generated proxy signature key to sign message 
<7p = sign{m,Xp) 
and produce the signature as 
Step 3: Verifying the signature (by verifier) 
The verifier checks the signature by 
verify{m,ap,yp), 
where y^ = � ’ � V � • ( ‘ � ） � m o d " 
It also check if the signed message is conform to the warrant of the agent owner. 
At the end of this step, the verifier accepts the signature. 
5.1.4 Remarks 
Our scheme skip the use of host static key. Instead, we use the private part the certificate 
to replace the host static key. Since this part is only known to the host, it can be considered as a 
trustee generated private key. In the generated signature, the identity IDq is replaced by the alias 
hg and the public part of the certificate r^. This replacement hides the identity of the signature 
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creating host. Since the alias is signed by the trustee, the verifier can request the trustee to reveal 
the protected identity in case of disputes. 
5.2 Group Signature with Unlimited Group Size 
5.2.1 Introduction to group signature 
Group signature was discussed by David Chaum in [CH91]. He introduced it by the 
following problem: 
A company has several computers, each connected to the local network. Each 
department of that company has its own printer ( also connected to the network) 
and only the staff of that department are allowed to use their department's 
printer. Before printing, the printer must be convinced that the staff is working in 
that department. At the same time, the company wants privacy; the staffs name 
may not be revealed. If, however, someone uses the printer too often, the director 
must be able to discover who misused that printer, to send him a bill. 
Group signature is a solution to the problem raised by David Chaum. It is a generalization of 
the membership scheme, in which a group member can convince a verifier that he belongs to a 
group, without revealing his identity. Formally, the group signature has following properties: 
1. Only members of the group can sign messages. 
2. The receiver of the signature can verify that it is a valid signature from the group. 
3. The receiver of the signature cannot determine which member of the group is the signer. 
4. In case of a dispute, the signature can be "opened" to reveal the identity of the signer. 
5.2.2 Constructing group signature scheme using certified alias 
Proxy signature with proxy signer privacy protection can be applied to construct group 
signature scheme with unlimited group size. The basic requirements of group signature are: 
unforgeability, verifiability, anonymity and identifiability [CH91]. In chapter 4，we demonstrated 
how to achieve both anonymity and identifibility by certified alias. Same technique can be 
applied on group signature to achieve the desired result. 
The resulting group signature will have the following properties: 
1. Unforgeability 
2. Verifiability 
3. Group member privacy 
4. identifiability 
5. Unlimited group size 
A detail description on the group signature scheme with unlimited group size is presented below. 
Assumptions: 




The group signature scheme involves 3 entities: Group Administrator (A)，group member (M) 
and verifier (V). There is at least one group administrator in each group of users. The group 
administrator is responsible for registering new user to the group. It generates aliases for group 
members. Each group member use its alias to identify itself in the group. Only the group 
administrator know the actual identity of each group member. As a result, when investigation is 
needed, only the group administrator can identify the signer from the group signature. 
The group signature scheme with unlimited group size contains 3 steps: 
Step 1: Joining Group 
When a user (M) wants to join a group (G) , he is required to convince the group administrator 
(A) that he is a qualified to join G . The authentication of group member can achieve by ordinary 
authenticate schemes. 
After authentication, the group administrator and the group member carry out the following 
computations: 
1. The group member generates a public-key/private-key key pair O似,y^) such that 
^M ^R ^q 
；；似=g�mod/? 
2. The group member sends the public key to the group administrator. 
3. The group administrator generates a random number kM and hashes it with the identity of 
the group member. The hash value, Hm , is the alias for the group member. 
hM = KkM,IDM� 
4. The group administrator then signs the public key and the alias together. The certificate 
also contain a message, m^, which states that the alias was issued to a member of group 
G, 
kA ^R A 
r^ 二 gk力 mod p 
5. The generated certificate, , � m ,爪ff^  � J then send back to the group member. 
6. The group administrator records the tuple ，�m ,爪pf , ^^m ,众m ) . 
Step 2: Signing and verifying 
1. When the user wants to signs a message, he uses his private key to sign. He creates the 
signature 
a = sign(m,XM) 
He also attach the certificate to the signature he created and produces the group signature 
2. When the verifier wants to verify the signature was created by someone belongs to group 
G, he verifies the public key in the certificate by 
g'^ -r^modp 
to confirm it was approved by the group administrator. 
3. The verifier then verifies the signature 
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verify{m,or,yj^) 
Step 3: Investigating 
1. In case of a dispute, the group administrator can identify the corresponding signer of the 
group signature by searching his database for the tuple 
�yM,hM,�,IDM,kM� 2. The group administrator send 
(/Av/，众 A/) 
to the verifier. 
3. The verifier computes 
KJcmJD^) 
and compares the result with the alias in the group signature. If they are the same, the 
verifier can be convinced that the signer of the group signature is M. 
5.2.3 Security Analysis 
1. Unforgeability: Only the group member can sign with the name M. This is because the 
group administrator and third parties do not have the private key Xm. 
2. Verifiability: The verifier can be convinced that the group signature is created by a valid 
group member. This is because the public key is certified by the group administrator, and 
the signature is verifiable with the public key by the equation 
verify{m, a, y^) 
These two conditions hold only if the signature is actually created by a valid group 
member. 
3. Group Member Privacy: Since the group signature 
does not contain any information directly related to the identity of M. The group 
member's privacy is protected. 
4. Identifiability : With the help of the group administrator, the tuple 
(yM,hM,�,IDM,kM� 
can be identified from the information provided by the group signature. The verifier can 
know the identity of the signer. The verifier can computes 
Kk^JD^) 
and compares the result with the alias in the group signature. 
5. Unlimited group size: The group administrator do not have to determine how many 
members does the group have before registering members. As a result, the group size is 
unlimited. 
5.2.4 Remarks 
Proxy signatures with proxy signer privacy and group signatures has the following 
similarities: 
1. In both schemes, the proxy ( the group member) has to get the authorization from the 
original signer (the group administrator) before it can sign. 
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2. The signature created by any of the proxies (any member in the same group) should 
means the same to the verifier. If dispute does not occur, there is no need to identify 
which proxy (group member) created the signature. 
3. Both schemes should have identifiability and anonymity. 
As a result, the group signature scheme we presented in this section actually transform the 
proxy signer to the group member in group signature. The trustee and original signer to form the 
group administrator. 
5.3 Chapter Summary 
The proxy signature with proxy signer privacy protection has many applications. In this 
chapter, we suggested two practical applications for it. Secure mobile agent signature directly 
applies the proxy signature scheme. In the group signature scheme with unlimited group size, the 
group administrator plays the role of both the original signer and the trustee in proxy signature. 
The techniques developed in our proxy signature scheme are suitable for applications which 




This thesis focuses on the privacy of proxy signer in proxy signature schemes. The 
solution to this problem is the certified alias. The thesis starts by introducing the concept of the 
proxy signature. The definitions and terminologies of proxy signature are given. Previous works 
on proxy signature are reviewed. 
The focus of this thesis is to achieve both anonymity and identifiability of proxy signers. 
These apparently contradicting objectives are achieved by introducing an alias issuing authority, 
or, simply, trustee. The trustee generates aliases for proxy signers. The proxy signers use the 
aliases to protect their privacy. The alias authority also keep track of all the aliases. If disputes 
occur, the alias authority have the power to reveal the identity of the proxy signer protected by the 
alias. 
We survey the application of proxy signatures. When the property of proxy signer 
privacy is introduced to proxy signature, the resulting signature scheme is suitable for many new 
applications. We explorer how it can be applied to mobile agents signature and group signature 
with unlimited group size. 
Above all, proxy signature is still a new kind of cryptographic primitives that can be 
useful in building many e-commerce applications. Much research and enhancements could be 
done on the security and application of proxy signatures. 
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